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I. INTRODUCTION
Today there are approximately 708,555 automated teller
machines (ATMs) worldwide, with 227,000 located in the United
States.' The arrival of ATMs, with the first U.S. ATM appearing
in 1971 in Atlanta, Georgia at Citizens & Southern National Bank,
has changed the way many Americans do their banking.2 The
convenience and accessibility of ATMs, along with internet bank-
ing, has resulted in fewer people going inside a bank, talking to a
human teller, and depositing or withdrawing money. In 1999,
there were 11.0 billion dollars worth of ATM transactions, down
200 million from 1998.3 Although an additional 40,000 machines
were added in 1999,4 part of the reason ATM transactions were
down may be attributed to surcharges. PSI Global, a Tampa,
Florida based research and marketing firm conducted a survey of
3,217 consumers in April and May of 1999 and found that in re-
sponse to surcharging, 15% of consumers have limited their use
of ATMs, 40% avoided fees by using only their financial institu-
tion's ATMs, and 11% use only those ATMs which do not sur-
charge.5
The topic of surcharging has become of interest to virtu-
ally everyone. This article discusses the history of preemption
1. See American Bankers Association, ATM Fact Sheet, (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.aba.com/aba/PDF__Files/GRATMFactSheet.pdf.> Prepared by
John Hall, ABA Communications. These figures were current as of Nov. 1999. See
id.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Helen Stock, ATM Fees Changing People's Habits, Surveys Find, Am.
BANKER, Nov. 24,1999, at 5.
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in the federal banking system looking at cases beginning in the
1820s to today, to determine if banks do have the right to sur-
charge and whether states can enact legislation which will
prevent banks from surcharging. The article first discusses the
issues surrounding ATMs, focusing on the different types of
fees, the imposition of surcharges, and the challenges to ATM
surcharges. 6 The article reviews the analysis the Supreme
Court and state courts have used, and continue to use, to de-
termine whether a federal law preempts a state law.7 Finally,
the article discusses the current litigation, market, and access
consequences. 8
II. ATM FEES
There are several types of fees involved when using an
ATM. If Jane is a customer of Bank A, and uses Bank A's ATM
to withdraw money, she may be charged a "fee" for using the
ATM.9 If Jane uses Bank B's ATM even though she is a cus-
tomer of Bank A, Bank A pays Bank B an interchange fee, Bank
A pays the network a switch fee, Jane pays Bank B a surcharge
fee and pays Bank A, her own Bank, a foreign fee.10 While
bankers argue that the fees are a reasonable charge for the
convenience of using another bank's ATM, consumer groups
argue that institutions are charging twice, or "double dip-
ping," since the ATM owner is also receiving an interchange
fee from the card-issuing bank, in addition to the surcharge fee
the bank which owns the ATM charges.1 ' The main focus of
recent litigation and legislation is regarding the surcharge fee
- the fee a customer is paying to a bank other than their own,
6. See infra notes 9-24.
7. See infra notes 25-144.
8. See infra notes 145-169.
9. See Robert E. Litan, ATM Fees: An Economic Analysis. A.B.A. Study, Nov.
1999, at 11. Litan's study was conducted on behalf of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation. See id.
10. See id. at 9, Chart 1-B.
11. See Helen Stock, San Francisco ATM Fee Vote Has National Implications, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 10, 1999, at 1.
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for using the ATM.
Prior to 1996, ATM operators could not impose sur-
charges directly on ATM users; instead, they were restricted to
recovering costs primarily through network agreements.' 2
Visa and MasterCard rules and some regional ATM network
rules prohibited surcharges at ATMs.13 In addition, a few
states enacted limits on surcharges, but did not directly pro-
hibit them.14 Frustrated by the restrictions, ATM owners
brought antitrust challenges arguing that the surcharge bans
inhibited ATM deployment.'5 They argued that ATM sur-
charges were necessary to cover the cost of ATMs where vol-
umes were low and/or servicing costs were high.16  The
antitrust action was settled again in April 1996, allowing the
ATM operators to surcharge.' 7 Regional networks followed,
resulting in over 80% of all banks imposing a surcharge on for-
eign transactions.18
For many, it just doesn't seem right to have to pay to ac-
cess your own money, and this view seems to be a motivation
for the interest in adopting laws that ban ATM surcharges.19
On November 2, 1999, the citizens of San Francisco voted on a
ballot referendum that banned ATM charges throughout the
city, and Santa Monica followed shortly after.20 California
Bankers sued to enjoin the San Francisco ordinance the morn-
12. Hearing on Consumer ATM Charges Before the House Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement by Lawrence B Lindsey, Member, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Lindsey Statement].
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Litan, supra note 9, at 11.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Litan, supra note 9, at 2.
20. See Helen Stock, San Francisco Vote Bans ATM Charges, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4,
1999, at 23. See also Joyce E. Cutler, Cal. Bankers File Lawsuit To Block Anti-ATM Fee
Ordinance, BNA BANKING REP., Nov. 8, 1999, at 752 (stating that "Proposition F,
which passed Nov. 2, 1999, by 62 percent to 38 percent, prohibits financial institu-
tions from imposing surcharges of any kind on any customer for accessing an ATM
located within San Francisco").
2000]
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ing after the election, while the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) moved to preempt the San Francisco ordi-
nance.21 On November 15,1999, Judge Vaughn R. Walker held
that federal law probably preempted the ordinance.22 On No-
vember 24, 1999, he declared that individual consumers in
Santa Monica could not use the ordinance as a basis for a law-
suit against banks that charge fees, and that the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors could not certify the results of the No-
vember 2, 1999 election.23 San Francisco and Santa Monica
have both announced that they will appeal the federal court
ruling that has temporarily barred them from enforcing legis-
lative bans on ATM surcharging.24 Until the court renders its
final decision, the question remains; does federal law preempt
state or local laws that ban ATM surcharging?
III. HISTORY OF PREEMPTION
The central question of this debate is whether such legis-
lation will be preempted by federal law through the National
Bank Act (NBA), or regulations of the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency promulgated under the NBA. A funda-
mental principle of our constitutional system is that "when the
federal government acts within the sphere of authority con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution, federal law is paramount
over, and may preempt state law."25 In the 1821 case Cohen v.
21. See Rob Garver and Helen Stock, OCC to Support California Bankers' Lawsuit
Against ATM Surcharge Ban, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5,1999, at 1.
22. See R. Christian Bruce, San Francisco Considering Legal Options As Judge Bars
Private Suit in ATM Cases, BNA BANKING REP., Dec. 6,1999, at 926.
23. See id.
24. See In Brief. Calf Cities Appeal Ruling on ATM Fees, AM. BANKER, December
15,1999 at 21.
25. OCC Interp. Letter No. 789 Uuly 1997), reprinted in [1997-98 Transf. Binder]
FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCIH) 81-216. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution states that, "[tihis Constitution and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.. .shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.. .any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." Id. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 414 (1821) (holding that a District of Columbia law allowing the sale of lottery
tickets does not preempt a Virginia statute prohibiting such sales).
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Virginia,26 Chief Justice Marshall held that "[t]he constitution
and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the consti-
tution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void."27
There are three basic ways in which federal preemption
may arise: (1) congressional intent to preempt state law;28 (2)
implied preemption based on the language and purpose of a
federal statute;29 or, (3) instances of an irreconcilable conflict
with state law.30
"Congress has not occupied the field of banking so as to
preclude state legislation because the United States has a dual
state-federal banking system."31 The "federal instrumentali-
ties" doctrine is the preemption theory applicable to activities
of national banks.32 This doctrine, which was discussed in
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,33 holds that:
26. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
27. Id. at 414.
28. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (holding that the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act (15 USCS 1461), preempted California law. The perti-
nent part of the Act stated that the Act supersedes any state laws insofar as they
impose weight labeling requirements that "are less stringent than or require infor-
mation different from" the federal law).
29. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)
(holding that the Federal Aviation Administration, along with the Environmental
Protection Agency has full control over aircraft noise, preempting state and local
control under the police power). See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947) (holding that the police powers of the state will be superseded by Federal
legislation when it is clear that it was the manifest purpose of Congress, or when
the Federal regulation is so pervasive, or the Federal interest is so predominate that
the Federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of a state law on the
same subject).
30. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141
(1982) (holding that even where Congress has not completely displaced state regu-
lation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law and compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical
impossibility).
31. OCC Interp. Letter No.789 (July 1997), reprinted in [1997-98 Transf. Binder]
FED.BANKING L. REP. (CC) 81-216.
32. See Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275,283 (1896).
33. See id.
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National banks are instrumentalities of the Fed-
eral government, created for a public purpose,
and as such necessarily subject to the paramount
authority of the United States. It follows that an
attempt, by a State, to define their duties or con-
trol the conduct of their affairs is absolutely void,
wherever such attempted exercise of authority
expressly conflicts with the laws of the United
States, and either frustrates the purpose of the na-
tional legislation or impairs the efficiency of these
agencies of the Federal government to discharge
the duties, for the performance of which they
were created3 4
Beginning in the 1870s the Supreme Court began to indi-
cate that state laws which interfere with the ability of national
banks to exercise powers granted to them under federal law
are preempted.35 In Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri,36 the
question was whether an Act of Congress prohibits the na-
tional banks of Missouri from taking a greater rate of interest
than the eight percent interest rate which is prescribed in the
Missouri Act.37 This suit was brought under the National
Banking Act of June 3d, 1864.38 In Missouri, the banks organ-
34. Id. at 283.
35. See Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527 (1876) (holding that National Banks are
subject to state legislation except where such legislation is in conflict with an Act of
Congress, or where it tends to impair utility of such banks as instrumentalities of
the U.S.); Farmers' & Mechanics' Natl Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S 29 (1875) (holding
that state laws can exercise no control over national banks, or in any way effect
their operation, except so far as Congress may see proper to permit); National Bank
v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870) (holding that National banks, as
agencies of the federal government, are exempted from state legislation only so far
as that legislation may interfere with or impair the efficiency in performing func-
tions by which they are designed to serve that government).
36. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1874).
37. See id. at 410-411. Missouri limited state charted banks to 8% and the Na-
tional Banks wanted to charge 9%. See id. See also 12 U.S.C. §85 (1994) (setting out
allowable rates of interest for loans, notes, etc.).
38. See Tiffany v. National Bank of Mo., 85 US (18 Wall.) 409, 410 (1874). The
provision under which the suit was brought stated,
Every association organized under this act, make take, receive, re-
502 [Vol. 4
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ized under the state laws are limited to eight percent interest
rate, but the rate of interest allowed by the laws of Missouri is
generally ten percent, and the Bank of Missouri, a national
bank, had charged nine percent.39 The Court explained that if
state statutes allow their banks to issue a rate of interest
greater than the ordinary rate allowed, national banking asso-
ciations could not compete with them, and there would no
longer be a level playing field.40 The purpose was to prohibit
discrimination against national banks.41 However, the Court
noted that if the rates were restricted to the rates allowed un-
der state statutes for state chartered banks, unfriendly legisla-
tion might make the existence of national banks in the state
impossible.42
The Supreme Court has indicated that the federal gov-
ernment is the ultimate authority in dealing with specific na-
tional banking issues.43 It has consistently "held that state
laws that conflict with federal law by preventing or impairing
the ability of national banks to exercise powers granted to
them under federal law, are preempted." 44
Not all state laws affecting national banks are pre-
serve, and charge on any loans... .interest at the rate allowed by the
laws of the State or Territory where the bank is located, and no
more; except that where, by the laws of the State, a different rate is
limited for banks of issue organized under State laws, the rate so
limited shall be allowed every association organized in any such
State under this act. And where no rate is fixed by the laws of the
State or Territory, the bank may take, receive, reserve or charge a
rate not exceeding 7 per centum...
Id. at 411.
39. See id. at 411.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 412.
42. See id. at 412-413.
43. See OCC Interp. Letter No. 821 (March 1998), reprinted in [1998-99 Transf.
Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (ccli) 81-271.
44. Id. See also Julie L. Williams, the Chief Counsel for the OCC noted in OCC
Interp. Letter No. 789 (July 1997) [1997-98 Transf. Binder.] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(ca-H) 81-216 (noting that the court has used the same language in several subse-
quent cases following Davis). See also Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 238 (1903) (hold-
ing state law prohibiting insolvent national banks from receiving deposits
preempted); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1899)
(holding state tax on national banks preempted).
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empted under the federal instrumentalities doctrine.45 Al-
though the Supreme Court has allowed federal law to pre-
empt state laws in many situations, there have been a number
of cases where the Court has given state law preference, unless
the state law either: 1) directly conflicts with federal law; 2)
frustrates the purpose of federal law; or, 3) impairs the banks'
efficiency.46 Such was the case in McClellan v. Chipman,47
where the court upheld a Massachusetts statute which voided
the taking of real estate in satisfaction of an antecedent debt
where the debtor was insolvent or in contemplation of insol-
vency, despite a provision in the National Bank Act authoriz-
ing national banks to take real estate in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted.48 The court stated that the dealings and
contracts of national banks are subject to the operation of gen-
eral state laws, unless it conflicts with, or frustrates, the pur-
pose of federal law, or impairs the banks' efficiency results.49
In First National Bank of San Jose v. California,s0 the Court stated
that national banks' "contracts and dealings are subject to the
operation of general and undiscriminating state laws which do
not conflict with the letter of the general object and purpose of
congressional legislation." 51 The Court found, however, that
the state escheat law was nevertheless preempted.5 2
The conflict in Franklin National Bank of Franklin Square v.
New York53 concerned a New York statute which prohibited
national banks from using the word "saving" or "savings" in
their advertising or business5 4 Since it was the policy of New
45. See supra notes 46-51and accompanying text.
46. See McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347,357, (1846).
47. See id. The Court relied on the reasoning set forth in Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 284 (1894), in concluding that the New York statutes conflict in
letter and spirit with the U.S. statute, and therefore must yield. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 357 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
353 (1870)).
50. 262 U.S. 366 (1923).
51. Id. at 368-369.
52. See id. at 368.
53. 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
54. See id. at 374.
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York to charter mutual savings banks, along with savings and
loans associations, the legislature was concerned that commer-
cial banks that used the word "savings" would lead unin-
formed persons to believe they were dealing with state
chartered savings institutions instead of banks.55 The Court
noted that since the federal government is a rival chartering
authority for banks, the federal government may constitution-
ally create and govern banks within the states, and it has fre-
quently expanded its function and authority to prevent
"disadvantage in competition with state-created institu-
tions."5 6 The National Bank Act does not limit or qualify how
national banks can receive deposits, and it provides that they
shall possess "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary
to carry on the business of banking... ."57 The Court found
no indication that Congress intended to make this aspect of
national banking subject to local restrictions.5 8 The court con-
cluded that the state law must submit to the conflicting federal
policy.5 9
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION TRENDS IN MoRE RECENT CASES
A number of more recent cases have continued the trend
of decisions holding that when there is a clear conflict between
the law of a state and the federal law, the policy of the state
must yield. In Smiley v. Citibank,60 a California resident held
two credit cards issued by a national bank in South Dakota.61
55. See id. The Court relied on the reasoning in McCulluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819) (holding that Congress has the power to incorporate a bank). See id.
56. See id. at 375.
57. Id. at 376 (citing 12 U.S.C. §24 (1952)).
58. See id. at 378.
59. See id. at 379. The Court held that it would be resolved as a matter of su-
premacy, not as to the wisdom of the particular policy. See id. Reed, J. dissenting,
wrote that since no federal statute expressly authorizes the national banks to use
the word "saving" or "savings" in their advertisements, they must conform to the
New York law for the protection of the public from misunderstanding. See id. at
379. He stated that he knows of no precedent that approved such a limitation on
state power as the Court now announces. See id.
60. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
61. See id. at 737-738.
2000] 505
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Both cards included a provision in the agreement regarding
late fees, which are permitted under South Dakota law.62 Ms.
Smiley brought the class action suit against a bank in a Cali-
fornia state court, on behalf of herself and other California citi-
zens who held the South Dakota banks' credit cards.63 She
argued that the late payment fees were unconscionable and
violated both the statutory and common law of California.64
Citibank argued that the cardholders' claims were preempted
by section 85 of the National Bank Act, which authorizes na-
tional banks to charge interest to its loan customers at a rate
allowed by a state in which the bank is located. 65
At issue was the location of the bank and whether late
fees equal interest.66 The OCC had interpreted section 85's
definition of interest to include credit card charges.67 Under
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,6 8
the Court stated that it would look to an administrative
agency's interpretation when there is ambiguity in a statute, as
Congress presumed the agency should resolve an ambiguity,
rather than the courts.69 Justice Scalia, on behalf of a unani-
mous Court, rejected several of Smiley's arguments on why
the ordinary rules of deference should not apply to this regula-
tion.70 The Court ruled that it made no difference that this
regulation was issued more than 100 years after the enactment
of section 85.71 In addition, the Court did not agree with
Smiley's argument that the Comptroller's regulation was not
deserving of deference because there was no rational basis for
distinguishing "interest" charges from "non-interest"
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. See also 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
66. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739.
67. See id. at 740.
68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 740-741.
70. See id. at 740-743.
71. See id. at 740. Justice Scalia noted that neither antiquity nor contempora-
neity with the statute is a condition of validity. See id.
506 [Vol. 4
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charges.72 The Court ruled that the regulation draws a line be-
tween those charges that are specifically assigned to expenses
that are necessary for making a loan and those that are as-
signed in event of the borrower's default.73 Smiley's final ar-
gument was that the regulation was not entitled to deference
because it was incompatible with prior positions taken by the
Comptroller.74 The Court held that the fact that an agency in-
terpretation contradicts a past agency position is not fatal, be-
cause Chevron charged the implementing agency with the
discretion necessary to resolve the ambiguities in a statute.75
The Court stated that while there is no question that section 85
preempts state law, the issue here concerned the meaning of a
provision and that interpretation did not deal with preemp-
tion.76
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the is-
sue of preemption in great detail in Fleet Bank v. Burke.77 In
1995, Fleet Bank sought an opinion from the Commissioner
that the Connecticut statutes governing the use of ATMs in
Connecticut did not place any limitations on federally char-
tered banks from imposing surcharge fees on non-customers
who use other banks' ATMs.78 The Commissioner responded
by stating that the Connecticut statute carried with it an im-
plied prohibition against the banks imposing fees on custom-
ers of other banks for using the ATM, since the statute already
allowed banks to charge a usage, or interchange fee.79
72. See id. at 741.
73. See id. at 741-742.
74. See id. at 743.
75. See id. at 742. See also Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that agency decisions should be over-
turned on appeal only when they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary"
to the intent of Congress).
76. See Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744.
77. 160 F.3d 883 (2nd Cir. 1998).
78. See id. at 884-885. CONN. GEN. STAT. §36a-156(b) (1958), reads:
Any bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union which
has established an automated teller machine which is not a satellite
device may, in its discretion, permit any other bank, Connecticut
credit union or federal credit union to use such automated teller
machine, provided, (1) if such permission is granted to any other
2000] 507
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Fleet brought suit alleging both that there was an erro-
neous interpretation of the Connecticut ATM statute, and that
the statute was preempted by section twenty-four of the Na-
tional Bank Act.80 The district court permitted Fleet to impose
the surcharge fee on non-customers who use the ATM.81 The
defendants appealed, challenging the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction.8 2 The court had serious concerns that
opening the federal court to preemption claims by plaintiffs
raising disputes about the meaning and application of state
law, risks an infringement on the authority of state courts to
construe state statutes.83 The court of appeals vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded with directions to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.84
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is-
sued an amicus curiae brief ("brief") in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Fleet Bank.85
The OCC submitted the brief "to assist the court in its analysis
of whether ATM surcharges on non-depositors are permitted
by federal law, should such an analysis becomes necessary."8 6
The OCC argued that operating ATMs and requiring fees for
the operation are both part of the "business of banking," and,
therefore, legitimate under the National Bank Act.8 7 National
bank, Connecticut union of federal credit union, the automated
teller machine is made available on a nondiscriminatory basis for
use by any other bank, Connecticut federal union or federal credit
union, upon payment of reasonably proportionate costs as de-
scribed under subsection (a) of this section, and (2) such use is oth-
erwise in accordance with subsection (a) of this section.
Id. See also infra note 10 and accompanying text.
80. See Fleet, 160 F.3d at 885; 12 U.S.C. §24 (1994).
81. See Fleet, 160 F.3d at 885.
82. See id. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that a complaint invoking
federal question jurisdiction to assert the federal question as part of the plaintiff's
claim, not to anticipate a federal defense. See id.
83. See id. at 892.
84. See id. at 893.
85. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Fleet Bank v. Burke, 160 F.3d 883 (2nd Cir.
1998) (No.98-9324) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
86. See id. at 2.
87. See id. at 3. See NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Corp., 513 U.S. 251, 258 n.2 (1995) (holding that, "the 'business of banking'
is not limited to enumerated powers in §24 Seventh and that the Comptroller there-
fore has discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enumerated").
[Vol. 4
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banks may impose fees for services provided to their "custom-
ers."8 8 Although "customer" is not defined in the regulation,
the OCC looked to the definition used in two dictionaries and
concluded that a person who voluntarily uses the bank's ATM
and pays for that use, is a customer.89 The OCC distinguished
"customer," a person who voluntarily uses the bank's services
or facilities for a fee, from a "depositor." 90 The latter is a per-
son who also maintains an account with the bank.91
The OCC concluded that a "national bank is not required
to obtain the OCC's prior approval for the imposition of a fee or
service charge," 92 and that it is immaterial whether the ATM user
is a depositor or not.93 For all of the above discussed reasons and
because the user has conceded to pay the fee for the convenience
of using another bank's ATM, the OCC contends that the imposi-
88. See id. at 8.
89. See id. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (defining
"customer" as "one that purchases some commodity or service"); BALLENTiNE'S LAW
DIcTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (defining "customer" as "a person who buys the mer-
chandise or engages in the service of another person").
90. See Amicus Curiae Brief, at 3.
91. See id. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4002(a)-(b) (1999) which provides:
Customer charges and fees. A national bank may charge its customers
non- interest charges and fees, including deposit account service
charges. For example, a national bank may impose deposit account
service charges that its board of directors determines to be reason-
able on dormant accounts. A national bank may also charge a bor-
rower reasonable fees for credit reports or investigations with
respect to a borrower's credit. All charges and fees should be ar-
rived at by each bank on a competitive basis and not on the basis of
any agreement, arrangement, undertaking, understanding, or dis-
cussion with other banks or their officers (b) Considerations. The es-
tablishment of non-interest charges and fees, and the amounts
thereof, is a business decision to be made by each bank, in its dis-
cretion, according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound
banking principles. A bank reasonably establishes non-interest
charges and fees if the bank considers the following factors, among
others: (1) The cost incurred by the bank, plus a profit margin in
providing the service; (2) The deterrence of misuse by customers of
banking services; (3) The enhancement of the competitive position
of the bank in accordance with the bank's marketing strategy; and
(4) The maintenance of the safety and soundness of the institution.
Id.
92. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
93. See id. at 3.
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tion of the fee is authorized under federal law.94
This, however, was not the end of the preemption dis-
cussion. The Fleet case was continued in part in First Union
National Bank v. Burke,95 in which Fleet Bank was the consoli-
dated plaintiff and the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency joined as intervenor-plaintiff.96  Here, the court
questioned who had the authority to enforce state banking
laws against in-state branches of national banks.97 This case
arose within the context of the "ongoing dispute between Fleet
Bank and the Connecticut Banking Commissioner over
whether a national bank may impose surcharge or 'conven-
ience' fees on non-depositors who access Fleet's ATMs" in
Connecticut. 98 One of the issues raised in this case, which was
not previously discussed in Fleet Bank v. Burke,99 was whether
the Commissioner's cease and desist order unlawfully inter-
fered with the OCC's exclusive regulatory and enforcement
authority over national banks on this subject.100 In its inter-
vening complaint, the OCC claimed that the National Bank
Act and related federal banking statutes showed Congress' in-
tent for the OCC to have exclusive and administrative en-
forcement authority over national banks for all laws, including
state banking laws related to ATM transaction fees.10'
The Court determined that the OCC is charged with the
enforcement of banking laws, although the OCC is not specifi-
cally referred to in section 484.102 The OCC has been granted
94. See id.
95. 48 F.Supp.2d 132 (D. Conn. 1999).
96. See id. at 135.
97. See id. at 135.
98. Id.
99. 160 F.3d 883 (1998).
100. See First Union, 48 F.Supp.2d at 135.
101. See id. at 135,137. 12 U.S.C. §484(a) (1994), provides:
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law; vested in the courts of justice or as such
shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by ei-
ther House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either
House duly authorized.
Id.
102. See First Union, 48 F. Supp.2d at 135.
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administrative enforcement power under 12 U.S.C. §1818, to
issue cease and desist orders related to any national bank's
violation of any "law, rule or regulation, or any condition im-
posed in writing by the agency in connection with the granting
of any application or other requests by the bank," or to pre-
vent any practice that the OCC deems "an unsafe or unsound
practice."103
The court determined that the OCC's position of exclu-
sive enforcement authority was likely to be successful.14 The
court agreed that the OCC could face irreparable harm if na-
tional banks under the OCC's supervisory jurisdiction were
forced to respond to the state, because such a rule would inter-
fere with and discredit the OCC's supervision role.105 The
Commissioner was "preliminarily enjoined from proceeding
with the pending administrative enforcement proceedings
against Fleet Bank and First Union National Bank until final
disposition of the merits of the OCC's complaint."10 6
The ruling focused only on the authority state regula-
tors had to enforce the Connecticut prohibition on banks'
charging non-customers for using ATMs, as Judge Janet Bond
Arerton held that the state could not coerce national banks to
observe the ban.107 At the time of this ruling, OCC Chief
Counsel Julie L. Williams had not addressed the issue of
whether national banks in Connecticut are allowed to impose
ATM surcharges 08 This left many state officials and others
confused.109 Deputy general counsel for litigation at the
103. Id. at 137. See 12 U.S.C. §1818(b)(1)(1994). See also James G. Kreissman,
Administrative Preemption in Consumer Banking Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 911, 929 (1987).
Kreismann noted that agencies decided whether or not to preempt and the courts
determine the "administrative preemption based on the legislative histories of the
enabling acts, the extent of the conflict between state and federal provisions, and
the policy choices implicated by administrative preemption." Id.
104. See First Union, 48 F.Supp.2d at 150.
105. See id. at 150.
106. Id. at 150.
107. See David Harrison, In Focus: Ruling on Connecticut ATM Surcharge Ban
Leaves Banks Confused, AM. BANKER, Apr. 26,1999, at 3.
108. See id.
109. See id. Gerald Noonan, president of the Connecticut Bankers Association,
said "most of them [national banks] are just bewildered as anything else, because it
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American Bankers Association said, "if they [the OCC] do de-
cide [to enact a ban], then the question of federal preemption
is clearly presented. That is a whole new story."" 0
On December 20, 1999 the Connecticut Supreme Court
issued a five-two decision overturning Banking Commissioner
John Burke's four-year ban on ATM surcharges."' Since Janu-
ary 1997, when the litigation began, FleetBoston has estimated
it has lost $15,000 a day in revenue on 370 machines.112 The
Connecticut Supreme Court decision did not address the fed-
eral preemption issue; instead, it focused on how the 1975
Connecticut law on fees should be interpreted.11 3 Since there
is no constitutional issue on which an appeal can be raised,
and because the case was decided by the state's highest court,
there is no other procedure in which Burke can appeal." 4
However, a Connecticut legislator intends to introduce legisla-
tion that would ban ATM surcharges in the state of Connecti-
cut when the lawmakers convene in February, 2000.115
Surcharging, which may lead customers of smaller banks to
switch to larger banks with more ATMs, is not the only option
Connecticut banks have." 6 Citizens Bank of Connecticut is
one of seventeen banks which have recently joined the SUM
program, a surcharge- free network in which banks agree not
to surcharge each other's customers." 7
didn't really solve anything." Id.
110. Id. (quoting Michael F. Crotty).
111. See Katharine Fraser, Conn. High Court Takes Banks' Side on ATM Charges,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 21,1999, at 1.
112. See id. at 2.
113. See Helen Stock, Conn. Banks Slow to Start ATM Surcharging, Am. BANKER,
Jan. 6, 2000, at 12. First Union Corp. of Charlotte, NC began applying $1 fees to its
123 ATMs the next day, on December 22, 1999, and FleetBoston Financial of Boston
also began charging $1 on its 518 Fleet and BankBoston machines on January 3,
2000. See id.
114. See Fraser, supra note 111, at 2.
115. See Katharine Fraser, ATM Fee Ban to Be Proposed in Conn., AM. BANKER,
Jan. 11, 2000, at 3.
116. See Helen Stock, In Brief. No-ATM-Fee Group's Membership Grows, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 10, 2000, at 6.
117. See id. SUM is administered by the NYCE Corp. ATM network and be-
gan in Massachusetts. It has extended to Connecticut, Vermont New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Maine, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. SUM
has 150 machines in Connecticut as of January 10,1999. See id.
[Vol. 4
BUSINESS METHODS
Although two municipalities, San Francisco and Santa
Monica, California adopted bans on surcharging, the Con-
necticut ruling leaves Iowa as the only state that bans non-
customer surcharges." 8 The litigation in Iowa over ATM sur-
charges has taken place in the case Bank One, N. A. v. Gutta."9
Bank One, a national bank with its main office located in Utah
and no offices in Iowa, installed ATMs at retail stores
throughout Iowa, including Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Sears)
stores.120 Shortly thereafter, the Iowa Superintendent of Bank-
ing ordered Sears to cease its operation of the ATMs, because
Iowa Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) calls for an in-state
office as a prerequisite for the establishment of ATMs.121 Con-
sequently, Sears ordered Bank One to remove all of its ATMs
from Sears' Iowa stores.122 Bank One filed suit, seeking a dec-
laration that section 36 of the National Bank Act (NBA) pre-
empts the provisions of the Iowa EFTA which prohibit out of
state banks from state from operating ATMs within Iowa.123
The district court denied Bank One's motion for a preliminary
injunction, claiming that Iowa's provisions were not pre-
empted and that Bank One was unlikely to succeed on any of
its constitutional claims.124 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered Bank One's motion for a permanent
injunction and ruled in its favor.125
Bank One argued that section 36 of the NBA implicitly
authorizes the placement of ATMs without restrictions by the
118. See Stock, supra note 113, at 12.
119. 190 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1999).
120. See id. at 847.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. The provision of the Iowa EFTA which Bank One objected to
reads:
A satellite terminal shall not be established within this state except
by a financial institution whose principal place of business is lo-
cated in this state, one which has a business location licensed in this
state under chapter 536A, or one which has an office located in this
state and which meets the requirements of subsection 4.
Id. at 848. See also Iowa Code § 527.4(4) (1998).
124. See Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847.
125. See id. at 851.
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states and that the provisions of the Iowa EFTA hinders that
placement, in addition to advertisements on ATMs.126 The
Court cited both Barnett Bank v. Nelson 27 and Hines v.
Davidowitz128 in stating that grants of both enumerated and in-
cidental powers to national banks "are grants of authority not
normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, con-
trary state law."129 In addition, where state law stands "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and the execution of the full
purpose and objectives of Congress," it may be preempted. 30
However, state regulations are not preempted when Congress
accompanies "a grant of explicit power with an explicit state-
ment that the exercise of that power is subject to state law." 31
For example, in section 36(c), Congress predicated the estab-
lishment of national bank branches upon compliance with
state regulations regarding branch locations.132
The court's next step was to determine whether an ATM
is a "branch" as defined in section 36. Prior to 1996, although
the definition of "branch" did not explicitly state whether or
126. See id. at 848. See also 12 U.S.C §§21-216d (1994).
127. 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (holding that states have the power to regulate national
banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with a national
bank's exercise of its powers).
128. 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding that the Federal Alien Registration Act of June
28,1940 was intended by Congress as a uniform scheme for the regulation of aliens,
and supersedes a state law requiring aliens to carry and produce on demand alien
identification cards).
129. Bank One, 190 F.3d at 848.
130. Id. at 847 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
131. See id.
132. See id. Section §36(c) reads in pertinent part.
A national banking association may, with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches:
(1) Within the limits of the city, town or village in which said asso-
ciation is situated, if such establishments and operations are at the
time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in
question; and (2) at any point within the State in which said asso-
ciation is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the
time authorized to State banks by the statute law of the state in
question by language specifically granting such authority affirma-
tively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to
the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on
State banks.
12 U.S.C. §36(c) (1994).
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not ATMs were included, the courts held that ATMs were sub-
ject to the same state restrictions as branches. 133 Since the 1996
amendment to the definition of branch "expressly" states that
ATMs and remote service units are not included, the court
held that Congress intended to end state authority over the
ATMs of national banks. 134 Given the legislative history and
the judicial decisions regarding the 1996 amendment, the court
concluded that Bank One's ATMs are not subject to the restric-
tions contained in the Iowa Code.' 35 In addition, the Court fol-
lowed precedent established by Franklin National Bank v. New
York,13 6 and concluded that the state's attempt to regulate the
advertisements on Bank One's ATMs was preempted.137 The
ruling will make it easier for national banks to reach into new
markets using electronic networks. 38
However, this case may be far from over. Iowa has
asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review its own ruling.139
The petition for rehearing notes that one judge dissented from
the ruling and argues that the majority reached too far.140
Judge Myron H. Bright argued in dissent that "many of the
restrictions imposed by Iowa law are consumer protection
measures that ought not be analyzed as geographical restric-
133. See Bank One, 190 F.3d at 848-849.
134. See id. at 849. The term "branch," includes:
any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or
any branch place of business located in any State or Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia at which deposits are
received, or checks paid, or money lent. The term "branch", as
used in this section, does not include an automated teller machine
or a remote service unit.
12 U.S.C. § 360) (Supp. IV 1998).
135. See Bank One, 190 F.3d at 849-850.
136. 347 U.S. 373 (1954) (holding that where was a clear conflict existed be-
tween the law of New York and a federal statute regarding advertising regulations,
the policy of the state must yield to the federal enactment).
137. See Bank One, 190 F.3d at 850.
138. See National Bank Act Preempts Iowa Statute Regulating ATMs Run by Out-of-
State Banks, 68 U.S.L.W. 1148 (Sept. 21, 1999).
139. See R. Christian Bruce, Iowa Seeks Rehearing in ATM Dispute, Urges Full
Eighth Circuit Court to Hear Case, BNA BANKING REP., Sept. 27,1999, at 494.
140. See id.
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tions."'141 Iowa Attorney General Thomas J. Miller said that
this case of first impression is being followed nationally by all
states, financial institutions, government regulators, and most
importantly, consumers. 42 On February 2,2000, Iowa officials
filed a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking for a review
of the September federal appeals court ruling.143 Iowa Attor-
ney General Thomas J. Miller and Iowa Banking Superinten-
dent Holmes Foster contend the Federal Electronic Funds
Transfer Act protects the Iowa law from preemption. 44
V. CURRENT CONCERNS
The purpose of the municipal prohibition in San Francisco
is to "protect consumers from exorbitant and unfair fees and to
protect smaller financial institutions from anticompetitive busi-
ness tactics." 145  The Board of Supervisors for the city of San
Francisco found that the rates and types of fees charged by finan-
cial institutions have increased at an alarming rate in recent
years.146 From 1993 to 1995, the rate of bank fees nationwide in-
creased at least double the rate of inflation.147 The surcharge fee
for ATM use along with the "off-use" fee that nearly all financial
institutions already charge their account holders for using an-
other institution's ATM can total $4.00 for a $20.00 withdrawal 48
According to the United States Public Interest Research Group
141. See National Bank Act Preempts Iowa Statute Regulating ATMs Run by Out-of-
State Banks, supra note 138, at 1149.
142. See Bruce, supra note 139, at 494. Attorney General Miller added, "[tihis
decision yields more questions than answers. Answers to those questions should
come appropriately from the full Court." Id.
143. See R. Christian Bruce, Iowa Seeks U.S. Supreme Court Review of Eight Cir-
cuit Ruling on ATM Placement, BNA BANKING REP., February 14,2000, at 323.
144. See id. Miller and Holmes argue that under the EFTA, "national banks
can be subject to state restrictions that offer more consumer protection than the
EFTA itself." Id.
145. See City of San Francisco, Cal., Legislative Digest for Municipal Code
§648.1, at 4 (Oct. 22,1998) [hereinafter Legislative Digest].
146. See id. at 1
147. See id. These figures are according to a study conducted by the USPIRG
and measured by the Consumer Price Index. See id.
148. See id. at 2.
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(USPIRG), the average fees are $2.41 per transaction, an amount
that equals more than a 10% charge for withdrawing $20.00 of an
account holder's funds.149 According to former Senate Banking
Committee Chairman Alfonse D'Amato, 122,000 out of the
165,000 machines were installed well before the double charge,
and in the beginning of 1996, only 17% of ATMs imposed such
surcharges, but by 1998, the number increased to 79%.150
The question of whether federal law preempts state or a
local law that bans ATM surcharges still remains. D'Amato
pushed for a bill to ban surcharges in 1998, but was de-
feated.15 ' Representative Bernand Sanders, an Independent
from Vermont, attempted to attach a surcharge ban to the fi-
nancial reform law enacted November 12, 1999, but the provi-
sion was watered down to require merely a disclosure of ATM
fees.152 Representative Sanders has reintroduced a bill that
would ban surcharges nationally, and Representative Maxine
Waters has introduced similar legislation. 5 3 In addition to
national legislation, several major cities are looking to follow
Santa Monica and San Francisco in introducing measures to
prohibit fees.'% The Department of Defense wants to prohibit
63 banks and 171 credit unions that operate on military bases
from imposing surcharges 55 Bankers are warning that if such
initiatives succeed, many banks will stop allowing non-
customers to use their ATMs.156 Both Bank of America and
Wells Fargo, which operate 86 percent of the ATMs in San
149. See id.
150. See id. at 2-3.
151. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Opposition to ATM Fees Spreading Coast to
Coast, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17,1999, at 4.
152. See id.
153. See Helen Stock, Debate Over ATM Fees Flaring Up in Congress, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 19,1999, at 10.
154. See de Senerpont Donis, supra note 151 at 4. New York, Los Angeles, and
New Orleans are among the cities discussing bans. The U.S. Public Interest Re-
search Group has reported queries from an "overwhelming" number of city coun-
cils interested in drafting surcharge bans. See id.
155. See Louis Whiteman, Pentagon Launches an Attack on ATM Surcharges, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 18,1999, at 1.
156. See Stock, supra note 153, at 10.
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Francisco, have refused non-customers access to ATMs in
Santa Monica.157  Both banks estimate they would lose
$455,000 a month in San Francisco if the ordinance is up-
held.158
One of the arguments used by the supporters of the San
Francisco initiative is that surcharging harms competition in
banking markets by disadvantaging smaller depositories such
as banks, thrifts, and credit unions. 5 9 Since larger banks have
many more ATMs than smaller institutions, customers may be
pressured to switch financial institutions to avoid paying sur-
charges. 160 Opponents of the San Francisco initiative state that
the average charge for small banks is $1.18, which is just below
the national average for all banks, $1.35.161 In addition, they
argue that smaller institutions can band together to form no-
surcharge alliances' 62
One opponent of the San Francisco initiative concluded
that laws banning ATM surcharges will harm consumers, re-
sulting in fewer ATMs and/or higher surcharges. 163 Since sur-
charge bans are aimed solely at financial institutions, they
shelter non-bank ATM owners from competition by financial
institutions in the ATM market.64 The Office of Thrift Super-
157. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Wells, B of A Recast Debate On ATM Fees
With Lockout, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1999 at 1. David Burgess, vice president of pol-
icy analysis at the California Bankers Association, said, "This is Economics 101. If
you can't charge for a service, that service might not be offered any longer." Id, at
8. Bank of American is the top ATM owner with 14,000 machines while Wells
Fargo if the fourth with 4,432 machines. See ATM Fact Sheet, supra, note 1. See Joyce
E. Cutler, District Court Rules for Banks in California Dispute Over ATM Fees, BNA
BANKING REP., Nov. 22,1999, at 842.
158. See Joyce E. Cutler, State Attorneys General Join Forces in Brief in California
ATM Fee Ban Dispute, BNA BANKING REP., Feb. 7,2000, at 269.
159. See Litan, supra note 9, at 18.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 18, 20.
162. See id. Opponents also note that a study by PULSE revealed that only 2
percent of consumers have switched financial institutions due to ATM charges. See
id. at 20.
163. See id. at 22. In a survey of ATM owners conducted by Dove Associates,
74 percent said they would remove some of their existing off-premise ATMs as a
result of a surcharge ban and 79 percent said they would not add any additional
off-premise machines. See id.
164. See id. at 23.
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vision concluded that the California ordinances do not apply
to federal savings associations by reason of federal preemp-
tion.165 It is possible that because only non-banks can continue
surcharging under the discriminatory prohibitions, they are
likely to buy off premise ATMs from financial institutions,
which may lead to higher surcharges.166 Studies by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board and consumer groups have shown that
credit unions and small banks tend to offer higher interest
rates on deposits and tend to charge lower account fees; losing
these institutions would therefore harm all customers, particu-
larly the elderly, who are often dependent on a fixed income
and reliant on the higher rates of return offered to account
holders at smaller institutions.167
At the time of this printing, attorneys general from nine
states and two commonwealths filed a joint friend-of-the court
brief on February 2, 2000, on behalf of San Francisco and Santa
Monica, arguing that local ATM fee ban ordinances are permissi-
ble under the National Bank Act and EFTA.168 What is certain is
that banks and cities proposing surcharge bans are likely to en-
165. See Rob Garver, OTS Weighs In on Teller Machine Fees; Says Thrifts Entitled
to Charge Nonclients, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 1999, at 4. The 20-page opinion holds
that the Santa Monica ordinance is preempted because the Home Owners' Loan Act
gives the OTS "exclusive authority to regulate the operation of federal savings as-
sociations." Id.
166. See Litan, supra note 9, at 23.
167. See Legislative Digest, supra note 145, at 3-4.
168. See Cutler, supra note 158, at 269. The attorneys general filing the brief are
from California, Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and the commonwealths of the Northern Mariana Islands
and the Virgin Islands. See id. California Attorney General Bill Locker said,
Nothing in the NBA regulates charges that banks may or may not
impose for ATM transactions. The EFTA, on the other hand, con-
tains an anti-preemption provision-section 1693q-that expressly
saves state laws protecting consumer rights in ATM transactions,
which encompasses the right to protect non-account holders from
ATM surcharges. In short, the EFTA authorizes the states to pro-
hibit the surcharges and the NBA does not preempt such authority.
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gage in a lengthy battle. One expert predicts it will be decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court.169
MELANIE ELIZABETH DouLt
169. See Helen Stock, Anti-Fee Activist Predicts Years-Long Fight, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 22, 1999, at 29. David Bartone, a Washington, D.C. lawyer with expertise in
ATM cases, predicted widening national skirmishes over the matter will "inevita-
bly" bring the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id.
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